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Quadratic voting as an input to cost-benefit analysis
Jonathan S. Masur
1.

Introduction

When administrative agencies regulate, how do they go about quantifying the costs and benefits
of their regulations? They are legally required to conduct cost-benefit analyses of major
regulations by executive orders issued by President Reagan and affirmed (or expanded upon) by
every president since (Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur 2013). Yet most agencies struggle
mightily at quantifying and monetizing the costs and benefits of their regulations (Masur &
Posner 2016). This is partly because the dynamic effects of regulations can be uncertain,
particularly so in future years. But the problem is exacerbated substantially by the fact that many
of the benefits produced by regulation are difficult to assess in monetary terms, even though the
benefits are almost surely sizeable.
Many regulations protect human life and health, which are goods that people effectively
buy and sell in markets. Pricing those benefits is complex, but at least it can be done on the basis
of what people will actually pay for them, using transactions in real dollars (Bronsteen,
Buccafusco & Masur 2013). At the same time, a large number of regulations also provide
benefits that are not traded in markets and cannot be so easily priced. For instance, many
regulations protect the environment and wildlife from harm associated with various sources of
pollution. Other regulations are meant to reduce social ills, such as discrimination or prison rape
that similarly are not bought and sold. Without being able to observe how much individuals are
willing to pay to obtain such benefits, agencies cannot attach reliable prices to them. Agencies
typically try to price these types of benefits using contingent valuation studies, which are
essentially surveys that ask people how much they would be willing to pay without any real
money actually changing hands. Unsurprisingly, contingent valuation surveys have proven to be
inaccurate and unreliable (Hausman 2012). What is more, in some cases nonmarket benefits
plausibly comprise a substantial portion of the overall benefits of the regulation. That suggests
that agencies are either under-regulating or over-regulating owing to their inability to monetize
nonmarket benefits accurately.
Despite the obvious limitations of contingent valuation studies, no alternative has yet to
gain traction. Agencies have been using contingent valuation studies for decades in the belief
that no better options present themselves.
That is no longer the case. Agencies should use quadratic voting (QV) to price
nonmarket goods that are otherwise difficult to value accurately. Quadratic voting, developed by
Glen Weyl (2012), is a decision procedure in which voters use actual dollars to buy votes for or
against a ballot proposition or candidate (Lalley & Weyl 2016). Each dollar does not translate
into one vote, however. The cost of buying votes is proportional to the square of the number of
votes purchased. Both the marginal cost of buying an additional vote and the marginal benefit of
doing so—the probability of casting the pivotal vote—increase linearly with the number of votes
cast. When marginal costs and marginal benefits are equal, individuals are likely to buy votes in
proportion to their actual preferences. This leads to socially efficient outcomes. Quadratic
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voting thus sets marginal benefits equal to marginal costs, which leads to efficient outcomes.
Voters are able to express more intense preferences than a one-person, one-vote system would
allow, but wealthier voters cannot hijack the election by buying vast numbers of votes. A
quadratic vote allows individuals to trade public goods—here, the benefits of the regulation—
against private goods—what they might otherwise have purchased with the dollars they spent
voting. QV thus mimics a marketplace and should lead to more accurate results than contingent
valuation surveys. In subsequent work, Posner and Weyl (2013, 2014, 2015) have suggested that
quadratic voting might be applied to broad swaths of law and policy.
Quadratic voting is particularly suited to the administrative state because agencies
already have the legal authority to use quadratic votes as inputs to the regulatory process. A
large number of organic agency statutes not only permit but require agencies to conduct research
aimed at understanding and estimating the costs and benefits of their regulations. Quadratic
voting falls well within these statutory grants. In fact, it is quite likely that agencies could write
regulations that would automatically be triggered by the results of quadratic voting. A regulation
could be written to take effect only if a quadratic vote resulted in a particular outcome, or it
might be written to vary in stringency depending upon the result of a quadratic vote. This would
effectively make quadratic votes legally binding, even without legislative intervention. Given
the advantages of quadratic voting, and the fact that agencies could adopt QV without waiting for
Congress, there is little reason for them not to act.
2.

QV as a substitute for contingent valuations

Consider a hypothetical environmental regulation that would force coal-fired power plants to
substantially reduce their level of hazardous emissions—including mercury, sulfur dioxide, and
particulate matter—at a cost of $10 billion. At the same time, the regulation would prevent 1000
fatal cases of cancer and 5000 cases of emphysema, and create a vast array of other benefits to
the environment and wildlife. The regulation would prevent the death of ten million migratory
birds that would otherwise be harmed when rainfall introduced airborne pollutants into the water
supply. As for the costs of the regulation, some would be passed along to consumers in the form
of higher electricity prices; some firms would see their profits reduced; and some workers at
those firms would be laid off.
How should the EPA, or the government in general, go about deciding whether to
promulgate this regulation? The difficulty is that the regulation involves nonmarket benefits that
are difficult to price. Agencies do a credible job of estimating the value of preventing cases of
terminal cancer (and saving lives more generally) because there is in some sense a market for
those goods: individuals demand higher wages when they take more dangerous or more
unpleasant jobs (Sunstein 2002). But they are not well equipped to monetize the value of nonmarket goods such as protecting the environment or saving wildlife because these goods are not
traded on markets. Individuals do not buy and sell protected wetlands or wildlife. In lieu of
being able to observe actual market behavior, agencies instead use “contingent valuation”
studies, sometimes called “stated preference” studies. These are essentially surveys, in which
respondents are asked how much they would pay to protect some natural resource or save the
lives of some wildlife.
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Yet contingent valuation surveys are susceptible to enormous error and viewed as highly
unreliable by most scientists and regulators (Hausman 2012). The fundamental problem is that
study participants are not making real choices, contributing their own money or confronting
opportunity costs, so they have no incentive to provide accurate measures of their own
preferences. Instead, each respondent has an incentive to try to skew the overall results toward
their own preferences. Someone who believes that she values a benefit more than other people
has an incentive to report a valuation even much higher than her own, in an attempt to bias the
result toward her own valuation by compensating for others’ lower values. For instance, suppose
that an individual values the preservation of endangered wetlands at $1000 but believes that the
average person values wetlands protection only at $10. That individual might report a value of
$100,000 (or more) on a contingent valuation survey in an effort to shift the overall result toward
her own value. Conversely, someone who values a nonmarket benefit less than the average
person does has an incentive to report an artificially low value—zero, or even negative if that is
allowed.
Even individuals who believe they are exactly average have incentives to misreport their
valuations if they believe that people who value the good more than them will provide valuations
that are skewed to a greater degree than the people who value the good less than them. For
instance, if the average person values a good at $10, people who assign higher values to the good
might want to provide much higher responses (in the thousands of dollars), while people who
value it less might be bounded at $0. Even someone who values the good at $10 would have an
incentive to report an artificially low value, such as $0, in an attempt to compensate for other
respondents’ biased values. The overall result is that individuals’ stated preferences will diverge
wildly from their true preferences, which will greatly complicate regulators’ ability to conduct
meaningful cost-benefit analysis (CBA).
Some contingent valuation surveys attempt to overcome some of these problems by
placing budget constraints on respondents, limiting how much they can value any given good. A
budget constraint will prevent individuals from offering the most outlandishly high valuations.
But these budget constraints are inherently arbitrary and can be counterproductive. If the budget
constraint is too loose, it is meaningless. If it is too tight, it artificially constrains individuals’
ability to express intense preferences.
Consequently, contingent valuation studies suffer from several well-known defects. They
yield results that are extremely imprecise—for instance, various contingent valuation studies
have pegged the value of a statistical life at anywhere from $40,000 to $13 million
(Environmental Protection Agency 2010). In addition, contingent valuation surveys are largely
impervious to the size of the benefit being analyzed. A very basic test of the reliability of a
contingent valuation survey is that it should generate dollar estimates that are roughly
proportional to the size of the benefit involved. Individuals should be willing to pay
approximately ten times as much to save 10,000 birds as they are willing to pay to save 1,000
birds. And yet this has not proven to be the case. Most contingent valuation studies to not even
bother to include this type of validity test, and of those that do, very few pass (Alberini et al.
2004; Cropper et al. 2011). It is little wonder that contingent valuation surveys have attracted
such scorn as a means of pricing nonmarket goods. But to date they have been viewed as the
best available option. For benefits that are not traded in markets, agencies have either employed
3
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contingent valuation surveys or simply failed to quantify the benefits at all (Masur & Posner
2016).
Instead of relying on unreliable contingent valuation surveys, agencies should use
quadratic voting to value non-market goods. That is, the results of quadratic voting should
effectively be used as inputs to cost-benefit analysis. To illustrate, consider the regulation
described at the beginning of this section. Suppose that the EPA uses standard revealedpreference studies to value the health and safety benefits of the regulation at $9 billion. The
question is how much the remaining benefits—preservation of migratory birds—are worth. If
(and only if) they are worth at least $1 billion, then the regulation is cost justified. The EPA
should hold a quadratic vote, with the question at issue being “Should the EPA protect ten
million birds at a cost of $1 billion?” Or, the question could be made even more concrete by
linking it to the voter’s own finances: “Should the EPA protect ten million birds, if doing so
would mean that your electricity bill would rise by approximately $2 per month?” In an era of
big data, it is even possible to imagine the precise question being tailored to individual voters
using the internet and sophisticated algorithms (Casey & Niblett 2015). If a particular voter
logged into a quadratic voting system, the EPA’s software would be able to estimate how much
more that individual (or firm) would pay each month for electricity if the agency were to
promulgate its regulation. For other types of regulation or government project, the agency
holding the quadratic vote might be able to estimate how much extra the individual would pay in
taxes. This would certainly be possible if the agency were able to access the individual’s tax
returns, which are kept confidential by the IRS. But it might even be possible using publicly
available information regarding the individual’s address or Zip code.
Individuals and firms would then participate in the quadratic vote, using their own
dollars, to determine whether the EPA should promulgate the regulation. The critical advantage
of a quadratic vote over the current method of stated preference surveys is that individuals would
vote with their own real dollars, rather than merely stating values that have little connection with
reality. Voters would have no incentive to state outlandish and unrealistic preferences (either
high or low); as is the case with quadratic voting generally, voters would have the proper
incentives to express their own preferences (Lalley & Weyl 2016). And at least in theory,
individuals have intrinsic preferences over things such as preservation of the environment and
non-human species (Ackerman & Heinzerling 2005). They should have some intuitive sense as
to whether they value these non-market goods enough to want significant amounts of money to
be spent on them.
Some individuals may have very strong feelings regarding the value of environmental
benefits and be eager to vote; others may be much more apathetic. In order to induce people to
participate, the government could increase the amount spent by some multiple before
redistributing it to the voters (Posner & Stephanopoulos 2016). This would enable most voters to
make money by participating, thereby inducing them to vote, without skewing the incentives for
them to vote their preferences. Such a system could become costly to the public fisc if tens of
millions of people were participating in each vote, but that is not necessary. Agencies need not
survey everyone. They only need to survey an appropriately sized representative sample of
potential voters (Mukhopadhaya 2003; Green & Laffont 1977). This will also facilitate the use
of multiple, sequential quadratic surveys, which will be helpful to agencies attempting to
4
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pinpoint the value of various benefits. (This issue is discussed in greater detail below.)
Alternatively, the government could make it mandatory for citizens to participate occasionally in
quadratic surveys, much like jury duty. This would have the advantage of ensuring a random
sample and high levels of participation at lower cost. However, it would likely require a change
in law, while simply paying participants would not.
Of course, a quadratic vote would not solve all of the problems related to the valuation of
nonmarket goods in CBA. Individuals will still be required to pass judgment on issues with
which they have little or no experience (Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur 2013). As with
contingent valuation surveys, even fully understanding the issue might prove difficult. People
are not well equipped to imagine what it would mean for a million, or ten million, birds to die
because of pollution. Ordinary life does not provide experience with such large numbers (Masur
2007). But the fact of using real money would represent a substantial advance over the
untrustworthy contingent valuation surveys on which agencies currently rely.
At the same time, a quadratic vote would introduce other complications. Regulators
using quadratic votes can establish floors or ceilings to the value of nonmarket benefits but not
point estimates. If a quadratic referendum on saving birds at a cost of $1 billion passes, it
establishes that the relevant population places an aggregate value of at least $1 billion on those
goods. If the referendum fails, it establishes that the relevant population values the goods at less
than $1 billion. But it does not necessarily establish exactly what the aggregate value is, and it is
difficult to glean such information from the results of the vote itself. Even if the referendum
passes overwhelmingly, with 80% or more of the votes supporting it, this does not necessarily
mean that the aggregate value placed on the benefit is greater than $1 billion. Drawing such a
conclusion would require strong assumptions regarding the behavior of voters and the extent to
which they apply game theoretic concepts when deciding how many votes to cast (Lalley &
Weyl 2016). By contrast, a contingent valuation survey will yield an actual number (however
unreliable) that the regulator can plug directly into a CBA. While in theory a regulator need only
conduct one contingent valuation survey (if it were reliable), the regulator will be required to
conduct multiple quadratic votes before it can come close to pinpointing a good’s value.
This will be necessary if the regulator plans to impose more than one regulation that will
generate the same sort of nonmarket good. And this is entirely likely. For instance, EPA
regulations of pollution emitted by power plants, Department of Energy energy-efficiency
standards (which diminish the demand for electrical power), and Department of Transportation
corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards all have the effect of reducing the quantity of
sulfur oxides, nitrous oxides, mercury, and particulate matter emitted into the atmosphere (Masur
& Posner 2011). Accordingly, all of these types of regulations will provide similar nonmarket
goods: preventing wildlife deaths from pollution, protecting habitats, and even reducing the
amount of smog in the sky. However, each of these regulations will do so to different degrees,
and the costs of providing these benefits will be different. Accordingly, regulators will need to
specify a value for these nonmarket benefits with some precision.
One option would simply be to wait until the agency planned to promulgate another
regulation and then hold another quadratic vote. Another option would be for the agency to
randomly segment the population into different groups and hold multiple quadratic votes related
5
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to the same regulation. For instance, with respect to the hypothetical EPA air pollution
regulation, when a voter logged into the quadratic voting system (or went to a quadratic polling
place), that voter could be assigned randomly to one of two quadratic voting questions: (1)
“Should the EPA protect ten million birds at a cost of $1 billion?”; or (2) “Should the EPA
protect ten million birds at a cost of $5 billion?” A “yes” result on the first question and a “no”
result on the second would justify promulgating the regulation and establish a floor to the
valuation of $1 billion and a ceiling of $5 billion. A “yes” result on both questions would justify
promulgating the regulation and set a higher floor valuation of $5 billion. (A “no” result on the
first question, and a “yes” result on the second question—implying that voters are willing to
spend $5 billion but not $1 billion to obtain a benefit—would serve as a useful indication that
something has gone wrong with the quadratic vote.)
Once an agency has established both a floor and a ceiling to the value of the benefit, it
could home in on the precise value using binary search. The agency would select the midpoint
between the floor and ceiling and test that value with a subsequent quadratic vote. The result of
that vote would establish a new floor (if the vote passes) or ceiling (if it fails) on the valuation
and cut the possible range of values in half. Because agencies should already be using random
samples from the general population, rather than opening quadratic votes to anyone, it should be
possible for the agency to simply draw another random sample of individuals for a subsequent
vote.
The more important constraint is that agencies should hold quadratic votes only when the
results of those votes will be reflected in actual regulation. It should not ask voters to offer what
amount to advisory opinions. The agency may not be required to do so legally—more on that
below. But if the agency wants voters to participate in its quadratic votes, it must be able to
make a credible commitment that the winning side will actually have its preferences enacted. If
an agency can establish both a floor and a ceiling to a particular valuation, this is feasible.
Imagine a regulation that would require nonmarket benefits worth $1 billion to be cost-benefit
justified. Suppose that in the first round of referendums, voters approve a value of $1 billion but
reject a value of $5 billion. Regulators could then test a value of $3 billion. If the vote
succeeded, the individuals who voted “yes” would believe (correctly) that their votes had been
respected. If the vote failed, those people who voted “no” would believe (correctly) that their
votes had been respected because the agency would not promulgate the regulation at that cost.1
At the same time, agencies are limited in the range of options they may use in quadratic
votes. For instance, if the regulation is cost-justified only if the birds are worth $1 billion, the
EPA cannot ask some subset of voters whether they value the birds at $500 million or $750
million, even though that would be useful information. If that measure passed, the agency would
still be forced to conclude that the regulation is not cost-justified. Failing to promulgate the
regulation despite a “yes” result could harm the agency’s reputation and dampen participation in
future quadratic votes. Similarly, if the initial quadratic referendum regarding a value of $1

1

If this latter point turns out to be untrue, and voters who reject a valuation of $3 billion feel as though their vote
was meaningless when the regulation is later promulgated based on a valuation of $1 billion, then the agency will be
required to adjust accordingly. This will become a problem only if voters cease participating because they think
their votes are not being respected, but that is a conceivable outcome.
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billion does not pass, the agency cannot hold subsequent votes at values of $500 million or $750
million in an effort to obtain a more precise estimate.
The optimal approach for an agency seeking to evaluate its regulations at the lowest
administrative cost is a technically complex problem. In some cases, the agency may be best off
waiting until subsequent regulations are being considered before holding subsequent quadratic
votes; in others, it may benefit from determining a more precise value immediately. The
agency’s choice depends on a suite of factors, including (a) how precisely it will need to specify
the value in order to make regulatory decisions; (b) how many subsequent regulations it plans to
issue involving the same benefits; (c) whether it has a belief as to what the value of the benefits
will turn out to be, and how confident it is in that belief; and so forth. The agency may need to
consult with outside experts in search methodologies, including computer scientists, before
choosing a path forward.
One final wrinkle in this analysis is that most regulations do not pose the binary choice of
some fixed quantity of benefits in exchange for some fixed costs. Rather, in most cases agencies
are faced with a range of regulatory options of varying levels of stringency. For instance, the
EPA might require coal-fired power plants to reduce emissions of various pollutants to one of
three levels based upon the availability of three different types of scrubbers. In some cases, an
agency can regulate across a continuous spectrum. For instance, when it prescribes fuel
economy standards, the Department of Transportation could require that manufacturers produce
automobiles that average 30 miles per gallon, 30.5 mpg, 31 mpg, 32 mpg, and so forth. As a
general (but not universal) rule of thumb, as regulations become more stringent, the costs of
those regulations increase non-linearly. That is, if it costs $100 million to reduce the level of
some pollutant by X, it will cost more than $200 million to reduce the level of that pollutant by
2X. The agency’s objective is to choose the level of regulation that maximizes benefits net of
costs.
Imagine, then, that the EPA has three regulatory options of increasing stringency. Table
1 summarizes those options:
{Insert Table 1 here}
The optimal regulation will of course depend upon the value of the non-market benefits.
If voters value them at zero, the agency should promulgate Option A. As the value of the nonmarket benefits increase, the agency should move toward Option B and, later, Option C. To be
precise, the breakeven point between Options A and B comes at a value of $2 billion for 1
million birds. If 1 million birds are worth less than $2.0 million, the agency should choose
Option A. The breakeven point between Options B and C comes at a value of $3 billion for 1
million birds. If the value of 1 million birds is between $2 and $3 billion, the agency should
choose Option B. If it is greater than $3 billion, it should promulgate Option C.
In this scenario, the EPA’s path forward is clear. It should select (at least) two
randomized survey groups and hold (at least) two quadratic votes: one that asks whether it is
worth $2 billion to save 1 million birds, and another that asks whether it is worth $3 billion to
save 1 million birds. (Again, it would be preferable to phrase these questions in terms of the
7
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money that each individual would be required to pay.) If both referendums are rejected, the
agency should promulgate Option A; if the first passes and the second is rejected, it should
promulgate Option B; if both pass, it should promulgate Option C. More generally, in this
context an agency should be able to decide which version of the regulation to promulgate with
only a few quadratic votes.
The situation becomes more complicated if we drop the assumption that the marginal
benefit of protecting land and wildlife from pollution does not decline. That is, people might
rationally value the first million birds saved more than the fourth or fifth million birds saved.
After all, some individuals might care primarily about preserving the species; after a certain
number of birds are saved, the remainder become less important. (It is worth noting that
nonlinearity in responses to contingent valuation studies is one of the principal pieces of
evidence used to reject those surveys as unreliable. If in fact individuals actually value
nonmarket benefits nonlinearly—as opposed to being unable or unwilling to give meaningful
answers to contingent valuation surveys—then perhaps contingent valuation studies are not quite
as unreliable as previously thought.)
In any event, if the EPA does not assume that the value of benefits scales linearly, it
cannot treat the environmental benefits involved as multiples of the basic unit of 1 million birds.
It must determine the value of 1 million birds, 2 million birds, and 3 million birds as if they were
separate entities, and then it must compare those values against one another in order to select the
regulatory option that produces the greatest net benefits. Again, without making strong
assumptions regarding the behavior of voters, a quadratic vote can yield only a binary yes/no
answer regarding the value of a set of benefits. Accordingly, the agency will need to conduct
several different votes before it can select the net-benefit-maximizing option. The same
principle applies if a regulation will create multiple nonmarket benefits. For instance, a
regulation might prevent the deaths of birds, otters, and turtles, and also protect sensitive
wetlands. In such a case, the agency would be forced to value the various goods separately,
which raises the issue detailed here.
One option would be to hold multiple quadratic votes with respect to each of the three
options. The EPA might segment the population into nine groups and ask whether saving 1
million birds is worth $1 billion, $5 billion, or $10 billion; whether saving 2 million birds is
worth $3 billion, $7 billion, or $12 billion; and so forth. The problem with this approach is that
some of the votes might wind up being advisory only. For instance, suppose that the referendum
on saving 1 million birds for $5 billion passes. If the referendum on saving 2 million birds for $3
billion passes, but the one on saving the same number for $7 billion does not, then the welfaremaximizing regulation is Option A.2 Some voters will have successfully voted to save 2 million
birds for $3 billion, yet the agency will not promulgate a regulation that does so. For all of the
reasons detailed above, that is not desirable.
Instead, the agency should sequence its quadratic votes. It can employ one shortcut,
which is to assume that the marginal benefits of saving more birds do not increase. Accordingly,
Option A is preferable so long as 1 million birds is worth less than $1 billion. The EPA should
2

The net health and safety benefits of Option A exceed those of Option B by $2 billion, and so Option B is
preferable only if it produces at least $2 billion more in environmental benefits.
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first test that proposition. If a referendum on that value passes, the agency can use subsequent
referendums to home in on the value of the benefit. Once it has roughly identified the value that
individuals place on 1 million birds, it can run the same process for 2 million birds to test
whether greater environmental benefits have sufficient value to warrant more stringent
regulation. For a regulation with a large number of options, an extended series of quadratic votes
might be required. However, the rulemaking process is already so long—most major regulations
take years to promulgate—that agencies should have ample time to complete a suite of quadratic
votes without causing additional delays. Again, selecting the precise sequence and number of
votes will be technically complicated and will depend upon a host of factors, including the
agency’s future regulatory plans. It may be sensible for the agency to consult with outside
experts before settling on a path forward.
In the alternative, one could imagine agencies using a system of quadratic voting with
credits, rather than dollars, as in Posner and Stephanopoulos (2016). Each voter would be issued
some number of credits which could then be spent on any agency-related quadratic vote of the
voter’s choice. Yet this approach is inferior to using real dollars in quadratic elections in several
ways, as Posner and Stephanopoulos explain. A system of credits would only allow voters to
trade off their preferences for one public good against another, instead of trading off public
goods against private goods. This problem is particularly acute in the regulatory context because
the universe of potential public goods is unconstrained. Voters (and agencies) cannot know what
regulatory benefits might be at issue in subsequent years, which will complicate voters’ efforts to
make tradeoffs. In addition, the government might issue too few credits to allow voters with
intense preferences to express them. Individuals will likely end up casting roughly similar
numbers of votes because there is no benefit to saving credits. But when it comes to valuing
nonmarket goods, it is likely that some individuals have much more intense preferences than
others. CBA should reflect this. Given the disadvantages of QV systems involving credits,
agencies should incorporate quadratic votes using real dollars whenever possible.
3.

Legal authority

While applying QV to many areas of law or policy would require a statute or even a
constitutional amendment (Posner & Stephanopolous 2016; Posner & Weyl 2015),
administrative agencies already have the authority to employ quadratic votes as part of the
regulatory processes. There are two potential mechanisms. First, agencies could use quadratic
votes as research tools, just as they might conduct contingent valuation studies or engage in other
types of research. Agencies already have budgets and mandates to conduct research, as the next
sections will describe in greater detail.
The downside of using a quadratic vote as a research tool is that the referendum itself is
not legally binding; the agency would conduct the vote and then separately promulgate the
regulation afterwards. This does not present a legal problem, but it may present a practical
problem if voters are reluctant to participate in a non-binding referendum. As noted above, the
agency can partially solve this problem by committing itself publicly to abiding by the results of
the quadratic vote and acquiring a reputation for reliability. Still, this strategy will never be
100% successful. The agency’s action might be vetoed by another executive branch actor, such
as OIRA or the president. A new president might be elected and withdraw the regulation before
9
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the agency can complete it. Some unforeseen event, such as an economic downturn, might
intervene and change the cost-benefit calculus, forcing the agency to rethink its plans. Even if
Congress blocked the agency from regulating by passing a statute, voters might mistakenly
blame the agency even though it was not the agency’s fault (Stephanopoulos 2016). A failure to
regulate for any reason could prevent the EPA from successfully holding non-binding quadratic
votes in the future.
This provides an incentive for the agency to attempt to make its quadratic votes legally
binding. The best way to do so would be to promulgate a regulation that is contingent upon the
result of a quadratic vote or series of votes. The regulation would go into effect only if a
particular quadratic referendum reached a particular result; or, if multiple regulatory options are
on the table, the regulatory outcome would depend upon which referendums passed and which
failed.
It seems quite likely that such an approach would be lawful, although there is very little
law on this point (Watts 2012). So far as can be determined, no statute explicitly addresses
whether an agency may promulgate a regulation that relies upon an external trigger and no
reported cases evaluating the practice exist. However, there are examples of regulations,
promulgated under a number of different statutes that automatically spring into force or are
suspended based upon some external triggering event. For instance, the Department of Labor
has promulgated regulations that automatically extend eligibility for unemployment benefits in a
state when that state’s unemployment rate hits 5% or when the state satisfies other criteria (20
C.F.R. § 615.11-13). Many other regulations can be suspended or reinstated at the discretion of
the executive. For instance, when the president or a governor declares a state of emergency, that
declaration automatically suspends a wide range of regulations, including rules governing
automobile and transportation safety (49 C.F.R. § 390.23(a)(1)(i)). States have promulgated
regulations containing automatic triggers as well. For instance, regulations issued by the EPA
require the states to devise their own plans to reduce greenhouse gas regulations. In the course
of complying with that requirement, seven states issued regulations that automatically suspend if
a court of appeals or the Supreme Court strikes down the underlying EPA regulation (e.g., Tenn.
Comp. R. & Regs. 1200-03-09-.02). The EPA, which has the authority to approve or disapprove
of state plans, has permitted states to use these automatic triggers (Environmental Protection
Agency 2012).
Automatic triggers are sometimes built into statutes as well. For instance, the EPA’s duty
to regulate is triggered when the agency finds that a particular pollutant “endanger[s] public
health or welfare” (42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)). Even more generally, many regulations take effect
only on a future date certain. That is a type of trigger, although a very formal one. Again, there
are no reported cases testing such provisions, and so it is hard to assess their legality with any
confidence. But the fact that agencies are allowed to use triggering provisions regularly and
without comment indicates that a trigger based on a quadratic vote may well be allowed.
Certain types of regulations, promulgated by certain agencies, are far more likely to
create nonmarket benefits than others. In particular, the most common—and perhaps most
significant—types of nonmarket benefits are environmental ones, as in the example from the
previous section. When the EPA regulates under the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act, the
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regulations will almost always affect wildlife and the environment, along with the lives and
health of human beings. Any pollutant that reaches the air or the water supply, and is thus
relevant to human health, will almost certainly affect the health of animals and their habitats as
well. Contrast this with regulation by other agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) or the range of agencies with authority over the financial markets, such
as the Commodities Futures Trading Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commission.
OSHA’s regulatory authority extends to workplace injuries and deaths, which are traded in the
marketplace for labor. And with respect to the financial markets, essentially all of the costs and
benefits of regulation are quintessentially market-related. Accordingly, in considering the legal
framework for agencies to incorporate QV, the sections that follow will first focus on the Clean
Air Act and Clean Water Act, as well as the Energy Independence and Security Act, which has
been the source of significant energy efficiency regulation.
3.1

Clean Air Act

The Clean Air Act permits the EPA to set limits on the level of a given pollutant that factories or
other sources may release into the atmosphere. The agency must set national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS) that cap emissions for a wide variety of pollutants (42 U.S.C. § 7410); it
also has separate authority to regulate new pollution sources (42 U.S.C. § 7411) and especially
hazardous pollutants (42 U.S.C. § 7412). Across all of these statutory provisions, the EPA’s
authority is phrased in terms of its ability to set “emissions limitations”—binding standards for
how much of a given pollutant the source may emit (Masur & Posner 2015).
But while the statute constrains the type of regulation the agency may promulgate, it
imposes no such constraint on the methodologies the agency may use when selecting the
appropriate level of regulation. If the EPA uses QV as a research tool and input to CBA, the
form of EPA regulation would not change. The agency would still promulgate standard
regulations based upon standard emissions limitations. This could even become part of the
notice-and-comment period: the agency could propose a regulation with the ultimate parameters
contingent on a quadratic vote and then hold the quadratic vote during the comment period.
When it comes to research tools such as this, the Clean Air Act is not merely permissive but
actually mandates that the agency conduct research:
The Administrator shall establish a national research and development program for the
prevention and control of air pollution and as part of such program shall . . . conduct, and
promote the coordination and acceleration of, research, investigations, experiments,
demonstrations, surveys, and studies relating to the causes, effects (including health and
welfare effects), extent, prevention, and control of air pollution (42 U.S.C.A. § 7403).
QV as an input to CBA would thus fall squarely within the EPA’s authority to conduct “research,
investigations, experiments, surveys, and studies” into the “health and welfare effects” of air
pollution.
Similarly, there would be nothing novel or controversial about the EPA using the results
of a quadratic vote to price environmental and other benefits. The Clean Air Act describes the
emissions standards the EPA should establish in a number of different ways. With respect to
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National Ambient Air Quality Standards, it instructs the EPA to provide “the maximum degree
of reduction of each pollutant . . . which the permitting authority . . . taking into account energy,
environmental, and economic impacts and costs, determines is achievable” (42 U.S.C. §
7479(3)). With respect to new sources of pollution, it directs the agency to set standards for
pollution emissions “achievable through the application of the best system of emission
reduction” while “taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction” (42 U.S.C. §
7411(a)(1)). Both of these sections invoke economic considerations, and thus both directly
implicate the pricing of nonmarket benefits that QV is meant to facilitate. Accordingly, courts
have consistently permitted agencies regulating under the Clean Air Act to use cost-benefit
analysis (Masur & Posner 2010), and in recent cases they have even pushed the agency to rely
more explicitly on comparisons of benefits and costs (Masur & Posner 2016; Michigan v. EPA
2015).
3.2.

Clean Water Act

Like the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act is framed largely in terms of pollution standards.
The statute gives the EPA the authority to set “effluent limitations,” in parallel with the Clean
Air Act’s emissions limitations (33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A)). The most salient difference
between the two is that the Clean Water Act instructs the EPA to require that regulated firms
install particular pollution-reducing technology—the “best available technology economically
achievable” (33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A)(i)) for some pollutants, and the “best practicable control
technology” for others (33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i)). Regardless, this language should raise no
additional hurdle to the incorporation of QV. The form of regulation will be the same: the
agency will set an effluent limit and require a particular type of pollution control technology. If
anything, the connection with cost-benefit analysis, and thus with the use of QV to price
nonmarket goods, is even tighter. The statutory requirement that the EPA select the best
technology “economically achievable” appears to call directly for something resembling CBA, as
does the requirement that the technology be “practicable,” if practicable is understood in
economic terms (Masur & Posner 2010). The courts have allowed agencies particularly wide
latitude in employing CBA under these Clean Water Act provisions (Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc. 2009).
The Clean Water Act also mirrors the Clean Air Act in its promotion of research into the
causes and effects of water pollution. The Act obligates the EPA to “conduct, and promote the
coordination and acceleration of, research, investigations, experiments, training, demonstrations,
surveys, and studies relating to the causes, effects, extent, prevention, reduction, and elimination
of pollution” (33 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1)). The statute anticipates that such research will take place
inside and outside of the EPA. It advises the agency to partner with states, municipalities, and
other organizations. It also permits the EPA to award research grants to a number of different
types of organizations, including state and local agencies (33 U.S.C. § 1255(a)) and “institutions
of higher education” (33 U.S.C. § 1259(a)). This authority is technically unnecessary for holding
a quadratic vote, which is revenue-neutral (except for the administrative costs of arranging the
vote itself, or if it becomes necessary to pay participants). Nonetheless, it provides yet another
indication that the statute envisioned the agency engaging with outside groups and individuals,
including financially.
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3.3.

Energy Independence and Security Act

The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) provides the Department of Transportation
with the authority to mandate more stringent fuel economy standards for automobiles and light
duty trucks (49 U.S.C. § 32902). Because fuel economy standards affect the consumption of
fossil fuels, they impact the environment and have the potential to provide a number of
nonmarket benefits that are difficult to value through traditional means. Accordingly, the fuel
economy regulations promulgated by the DOT are prime candidates for the use of quadratic
voting.
The EISA is explicit in requiring the Department of Transportation to consider the
economic effects of its fuel economy standards. The statute mandates that “each standard shall
be the maximum feasible average fuel economy level” (49 U.S.C. § 39202(a)), with “feasible”
defined in part with reference to “economic practicability” (49 U.S.C. § 39202(f)). When the
agency has regulated under this statute, it has done so according to a cost-benefit analysis that
takes into account extensive nonmarket benefits to the environment (Masur & Posner 2011).
Furthermore, the Department of Transportation is not merely permitted but required to
conduct studies and engage in outside consultation in formulating its regulations. The statute
directs the DOT to consult with both the Department of Energy and the Environmental
Protection Agency when formulating fuel economy standards, given the overlap with those
agencies’ jurisdictions (49 U.S.C. § 39202(b)(1)). The DOT likewise is required to “adopt and
implement appropriate test methods, measurement metrics, fuel economy standards, and
compliance and enforcement protocols that are appropriate, cost-effective, and technologically
feasible” (49 U.S.C.A. § 32902(k)(2)).
Perhaps most interestingly for present purposes, the EISA requires the Department of
Transportation to partner with the National Academy of Sciences to produce a report on fuel
economy standards, including “an analysis of existing and potential technologies that may be
used practically to improve automobile and medium-duty and heavy-duty truck fuel economy”
(121 Stat. 1492, Sec. 107). It might be premature for the National Academy of Sciences to hold
quadratic referendums in the course of preparing this report; the statute requires that the National
Academy begin writing the report “as soon as practicable,” which might predate the agency’s
regulatory efforts. But it raises the more general possibility that the National Academy of
Sciences could become a centralized clearinghouse for quadratic voting. Individual agencies
possess expertise in their particular areas of regulation, but they may not acquire significant
expertise in running quadratic votes. Some agencies may need to administer quadratic
referendums only quite rarely if relatively few of their regulations involve nonmarket benefits.
(The EPA may be an exception.) At the same time, holding quadratic referendums will require
both technological infrastructure—the voting booths, electronic or physical—and expertise in
presenting questions and information in accessible fashion. There is an analogy to CBA itself.
Agencies such as the EPA that frequently engage in cost-benefit analysis appear to have become
relatively proficient in it, and their CBAs are relatively more comprehensive. By comparison,
agencies that conduct cost-benefit analysis only very rarely, such as the Department of
Agriculture or the Patent and Trademark Office, struggle with the methodology and produce
CBAs that are highly incomplete and riddled with errors (Masur & Posner 2016; Masur 2016).
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An argument can thus be made for centralizing authority over quadratic voting within a
single agency. That agency could be OIRA, the usual repository for centralized authority in the
American administrative state. But OIRA does not typically conduct external studies or generate
external data; what studies it does conduct usually pertain to the regulations that other agencies
have promulgated. By contrast, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) frequently is tasked
with conducting studies and preparing reports on technical topics of importance to the executive
branch, and using quadratic voting to price regulatory benefits is well within the range of typical
NAS activity (Benjamin & Rai 2008). Agencies could approach the National Academy with the
issues on which they require data; the National Academy could determine how to translate those
requests into quadratic votes.
3.4.

Other areas of regulation

In addition to the statutes summarized above, numerous other statutes, administered by a variety
of agencies, are likely to create substantial nonmarket benefits. None of these statutes contains a
legal barrier to using quadratic voting, and thus the agencies that administer them should
consider immediately employing quadratic votes to value the relevant nonmarket benefits. Here
is a sampling:
3.4.1 Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. § 1531)
The ESA affects the work of a number of federal agencies, none more directly than the
Department of the Interior, which is charged with promulgating land use regulations to protect
the habitats of endangered species. A typical effort is the agency’s 1994 regulation protecting
the Mojave habitat of the endangered desert tortoise (Environmental Protection Agency 1994).
The principal benefit of this regulation is the saved tortoises themselves, but the agency was
unable to quantify that benefit using traditional methods.
3.4.2 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. § 1332)
The Department of the Interior (DOI) also has authority to promulgate regulations to enforce this
statute, which is designed to safeguard the outer continental shelf against environmental
degradation. The DOI uses its authority under the Act to make rules regarding, among other
things, the safety of offshore oil drilling platforms. In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the DOI promulgated new regulations that tightened safety rules for
offshore drilling and mandated more advanced equipment and training (Department of the
Interior 2010). Quadratic voting could aid the agency in monetizing many of the benefits from
avoiding another oil spill, including damage to the ocean ecosystem and deaths of marine life.
Here, the DOI did not even begin to attempt to quantify this or other benefits.
3.4.3 National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. § 4321)
NEPA is another statute that impacts numerous agencies, among them the Department of
Agriculture, which has regulatory authority over forests and logging. For instance, in 2003 the
agency promulgated a regulation to block the building of roads in large swaths of Alaskan forest
14
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in the interest of protecting native wildlife from being disturbed by automobiles (Department of
Agriculture 2003). The agency did not attempt to quantify the nonmarket benefits that the
regulation would produce.
3.4.4 Prison Rape Elimination Act (42 U.S.C. § 15601)
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has authority under this statute to promulgate regulations
designed to reduce the incidence of prison rape. In 2012, it issued a regulation that mandated
greater security and monitoring in federal prisons (Department of Justice 2012a). In monetizing
the benefit of reducing the incidence of prison rape, the DOJ relied upon both contingent
valuation surveys and jury verdicts in actual cases (Department of Justice 2012b). Neither
involves an individual actually putting his or her own money at stake; although jury verdicts
involve real dollars, they are someone else’s dollars. The DOJ would have been better off using
a quadratic vote.
3.4.5 Immigration and Nationalization Act (8 U.S.C. § 1103)
Under this statute and the Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C. § 112), the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has substantial authority to establish procedures governing visas and
immigration. Many of the costs and benefits related to immigration are involved in market
transactions. But in some cases, benefits may not be market-based and elude easy quantification.
For instance, for many years a noncitizen living in the United States who was applying for a visa
was forced to leave the country while the visa was being processed. In 2013, DHS promulgated
a regulation allowing noncitizens to remain in the country while their visas were being reviewed,
sparing them the hardship of being separated from their jobs and families (Department of
Homeland Security 2013). Some of the benefits are market-based (the noncitizen may be able to
continue working), while others, such as avoiding being separated from one’s family, represent
non-market benefits. DHS could have used a quadratic vote to determine the value of the latter,
which it could not quantify.
3.4.6 Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act (38 U.S.C. § 4212)
The Department of Labor has rulemaking authority under this and a variety of related statutes, all
of which allow the agency to promulgate rules to reduce the incidence of discrimination against
various classes of workers. In 2013, the DOL promulgated regulations designed to prevent
workplace discrimination against disabled veterans (Department of Labor 2013). Some of the
benefits from preventing such discrimination are market-based (via the employer-employee
relationship) and easier to monetize. But the DOL also cited benefits related to dignity and
equity, which it was not able to monetize, and which would be ripe for consideration through a
quadratic vote.
4.

Conclusion

Quadratic voting should be used as a complement to CBA and used to improve agencies’ ability
to value nonmarket benefits that are typically difficult to monetize. Unlike many areas of law
and policy, where implementing quadratic voting would require legislation, agencies already
15
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have the power under their existing organic statutes to employ quadratic votes in regulation. A
wide variety of regulatory areas exist wherein QV could improve regulatory outcomes, and the
relevant statutes offer nothing but encouragement. Administrative agencies can and should
move immediately to incorporate quadratic voting into the regulatory process.
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Table 1: The EPA’s Three Regulatory Options
Option A
Health and safety
$3 billion
benefits (cancer and
emphysema cases
avoided)
Costs:
$2 billion
Non-market benefits:

1 million birds saved

Option B
$4 billion

Option C
$6 billion

$5 billion

$10 billion

2 million birds saved

3 million birds saved
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